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I. Introduction 
 
1. At its July 2011 meeting the Fund Council discussed financing challenges faced by the CGIAR 
Fund. This paper aims to provide inputs to support the CGIAR Fund‟s move to more stable and 
predictable funding as an essential feature of CGIAR reform. The new CGIAR is expected to harmonize 
and maximize funding for priority research areas, simplify structures, reduce transaction costs and 
achieve results through agreed CGIAR Research Programs. In its first year the CGIAR Fund has 
succeeded in pooling significant resources for research priorities. However, without similar progress 
toward predictable multi-year funding, the full benefits of the CGIAR Fund may not be realized. This 
paper is directed at helping the CGIAR Fund to achieve more predictable, multi-year funding through an 
agreed resource mobilization mechanism. The latter is one component of a broader resource mobilization 
strategy for the CGIAR Fund. 
 
II. CGIAR Research Program (CRP) and Challenges Ahead 
 
2. The CRPs, including their budgets, are drafted by the respective Lead CGIAR Center, with 
significant input from other Centers and partners. The CRP budgets are reviewed and cleared by the 
Consortium Board before the entire program is sent to the Fund Council for approval. The total budget of 
each CRP is separated into two components, the Fund Council component, expected to be funded from 
Windows 1 & 2 of the Fund, and the bilateral component, funded from Window 3 and bilateral funds. 
This paper focuses on establishing a sound financial framework for the former.   
 
3. Given the uncertainty around future levels of bilateral funding, the expected split in the proposed 
budgets between the CGIAR Fund component and the Bilateral component beyond the first year of a CRP 
are tentative. Most CRPs predict sharp declines in the size of the bilateral component of the CRP budget 
after year one, with a commensurate increase in the Window 1 & 2 Component.  
 
4. Prior to establishing the CGIAR Fund and the Consortium, each Center was responsible for its 
own research impacts and outputs, and for raising its own funding from donors. Donors contributed to the 
Centers in an uncoordinated manner, with the Centers competing with each other for funding which 
resulted in uncertainty and impeded the ability of Centers to manage long-term research programs. It was 
common practice for Centers to set their annual budgets at the start of the year with incomplete 
knowledge of exactly how much they would receive from donors. Any late payments or defaults had 
significant effects on Center work programs with concomitant impact on research efficiency and quality. 
 
5. The CGIAR reform, implemented during2009-10 was based on the principles set out in the Paris 
Declaration, to which most donors have subscribed as a means to harmonize and align their actions and 
manage aid funding for results. In addition, a key component of the reform was to provide a mechanism 
for donors to pool their resources into a new trust fund for the CGIAR around a common set of focused 
objectives for development. The portfolio of CRPs clearly defines the research required to achieve 
tangible impacts on global development challenges and lays out the associated costs of the CRPs over the 
next three to five years. Lead Centers for each CRP require predictable funding over the same period in 
order to set up contractual arrangements with the participating CGIAR Centers and other non-CGIAR 
partners. In the absence of robust funding projections, Lead Centers may be reluctant to enter into multi-
year agreements with research providers and the problem of the mismatch between short-term funding for 
long-term research will continue to prevail. 
 
6. The challenges resulting from unpredictable funding must be overcome if the reformed CGIAR is 
to achieve its objectives.  Although the first year of CGIAR Fund operations is not yet complete, there are 
some worrying signs that indicate funding predictability continues to be a major challenge; for example: 
 
 
3 
 
 
a. The total 2011 expected inflow to the CGIAR Fund is still not known with certainty with 
only two months to go before the end of the year; 
b. Only three donors have signed Contribution Agreements/Arrangements which extend 
beyond 2011, and these are for small amounts;  
c. Timely disbursements to CRPs have been constrained by liquidity issues;  
d. The projected inflows for 2012 and 2013 are based on informal communications with donors 
which cannot be guaranteed, yet the Fund Council has approved a portfolio of CRPs which 
exceeds the projected funding supply—albeit in good faith that donors will make the 
necessary contributions as and when required. 
 
7. The CGIAR Fund has an important responsibility to its stakeholders to carefully account for 
funds, to manage its finances wisely, and to plan for the adequate funding of research. In carrying out 
these duties, the CGIAR Fund must ensure that it can provide adequate and timely funding, which will 
ultimately support the Consortium in its budget planning process for CRPs. This goal becomes even more 
relevant in times of fiscal constraint when predictable and stable financing may be more difficult to attain.   
 
8. While the CGIAR reform has brought about welcome changes to the funding approval process 
resulting in a portfolio of new programs, the same cannot be said for cash inflows from donors which 
continue to be based on “old CGIAR” practices. These are characterized, inter alia, by (i) annual cycle of 
contributions  rather than multi-year contributions; (ii) the unpredictable and sporadic timing of their 
payments, (iii) independent and disconnected decision-making on bilateral funding; (iv) continuation of 
the CGIAR MDTF fund approach through Window 3 of the CGIAR Fund; and (v) direct donor 
negotiations with Centers. 
 
III. Summary of the Fund Council Discussion on the Financial Challenges 
 
9. In July 2011, the Fund Council discussed the long term and short-term financing challenges of the 
CGIAR Fund. The Trustee and the Fund Office presented an analysis
1
 of three cash flow scenarios, based 
on projected donor contributions and CRP approvals for the period 2011 to 2013. The first two scenarios 
illustrated the importance of receiving donor inflows in advance of the disbursement needs of Centers. 
The third scenario illustrated the additional donor funding required and the timing of these donor 
payments in order to meet projected disbursement requirements from Windows 1 and 2 for all sixteen 
programs (including Genebanks) over the next three years.  
 
10. To address critical and immediate disbursement shortfalls, expected to begin in 2012, the Fund 
Council agreed to a short-term action plan. This plan included (i) the immediate mobilization of 
additional donor contributions into the CGIAR Fund by March 2012; (ii) a note on funding mechanisms 
co-authored by the Fund Office and Trustee (which this paper fulfills); (iii) the organization of a donors‟ 
meeting to agree on improved predictability and volume of inflows; (iv) set a realistic total financing 
envelope up to 2013; and (v) request the Consortium to prepare a finance plan aligned with the approved 
envelope. On Consortium-led actions, the Fund Council reached consensus on the following (i) the 
preparation of a financial plan aligned with a realistic approved financing envelope, taking into account 
priorities of the Consortium; (ii) rescheduling the disbursement amount of CRPs to align with the 
projected inflows; and (iii) economizing and prioritizing on CRP budgets. 
 
11. The long-term action plan focused on addressing the longer term financial sustainability of the 
CGIAR Fund with the following actions to be considered by Fund Council: (i) increasing the 
                                                          
1 Trustee‟s PowerPoint presentation is available at the FC5 meeting web site at: http://www.cgiarfund.org/cgiarfund/5th_fund_council_meeting 
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predictability, adequacy and reliability of the flow of funds; (ii) building up a prudent level of liquidity; 
and (iii) monitoring the accuracy of projected donor transfers. 
 
IV. Resource Mobilization Approaches 
 
12. All large multilateral funds must address the question of which resource mobilization mechanism 
meets their needs. For funds supported primarily through ODA grants, the fundraising process is handled 
in a range of ways. Most large multilateral funds begin in a somewhat ad hoc way with commitment of 
contributions from the initial donors, followed by outreach to additional donors. Over time, many move to 
a more regular and systematic process to replenish their resources, which could involve single- or multi-
year commitments made at periodic “replenishment rounds”.  Large multilateral funds also must tackle a 
key consideration of the funding approach—“burden-shared” (under which donor shares are roughly 
based on an independent measure such as share of world GDP) vs. voluntary approaches (under which 
donor amounts are based on individual interest/capacity). There is no perfect or „best practice‟ method; 
each fund must choose for itself a method that suits its operations and the budgetary procedures of its 
particular donors. The following paragraphs present a brief summary of the history of the resource 
mobilization mechanisms of several large multilateral funds. See the attached Annex for a summary of the 
resource mobilization mechanisms of several multilateral funds in which CGIAR donors participate.    
 
13. The Global Environment Facility: After a brief pilot period with a voluntary funding mechanism, 
the Global Environment Facility (the GEF) established a resource mobilization mechanism based on the 
replenishment mechanism of the International Development Agency (IDA). GEF‟s donors were largely 
the same as IDA‟s.  They were thus familiar with the IDA process and believed it functioned effectively.   
GEF replenishment cycles span four-year periods, and include, like IDA, a burden-shared approach. The 
GEF is currently in its fifth pledging cycle.  
 
14. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: In the case of the Global Fund, 
donors decided on an annual, ad hoc fundraising mechanism for its first few years. This made it difficult 
to plan a work program beyond one year since many Global Fund donors pledged only for a single year. 
To help provide assurance of sustainable and predictable funding beyond one year, the Global Fund 
eventually moved to a periodic multi-year pledging mechanism based on a number of other large 
multilateral funds. It began with a two-year funding cycle, but eventually moved to three-years. Unlike 
the GEF, the contributions of the Global Fund are not burden-shared. 
 
15. The GAVI Alliance: operated for ten years before moving to its first big pledge campaign in 
2011. The change to a four-year donor commitment period was in response to developing countries‟ 
preference to match the cycle of donor commitments more closely with those of their national plans. The 
current funding cycle for the GAVI Alliance covers a four-year commitment cycle by donors. Like the 
Global Fund, the GAVI resource mobilization mechanism provides for voluntary contributions.   
 
16. The Global Partnership for Education (formerly known as the Education for All—Fast Track 
Initiative): also operated for many years without predictable long-term financing commitments from 
donors. Similar to the very early days of the CGIAR, the Global Partnership for Education (the GPE) had 
multiple multi-donor trust fund accounts with pledges from donors, some of which were single year, some 
multi-year. A decision was made in May 2011 by the then EFA-FTI Board of Directors (now the Global 
Partnership for Education Board of Directors) to launch a formal replenishment campaign to mobilize 
resources both for the Global Partnership for Education Fund and for basic education generally, for the 
period 2011 to 2014. The first ever pledging conference will be held in November 2011. The GPE plans 
to report on the outcome of the conference, outlining the contributions of all partners, including bilateral 
aid and domestic financing that also support the policy objectives of the Partnership.  
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17. It should be noted that, in all cases cited above, the adoption of a formal resource mobilization 
mechanism does not preclude the acceptance of contributions, voluntary or otherwise, outside of the 
funding cycle. 
 
V. Benefits of a Formal Resource Mobilization Mechanism for the CGIAR Fund  
 
18. Underpinning each of the resource mobilization mechanisms discussed above are two critical 
elements. These include (i) an outreach plan to engage donors and other stakeholders, such as recipients, 
civil society, and international organizations; and (ii) logistical planning—typically handled by the 
secretariat of the fund (number and location of meetings, etc). As a general rule, the outreach strategy 
includes consultations, both formal and informal, to ensure engagement at all levels and explore novel 
ideas on financial arrangements that require additional deliberations before disclosure. Both elements are 
tailored to the funding mechanism adopted and provide a foundation to build global visibility, 
international and local support, and a public relations campaign.   
 
19. A collective mechanism to mobilize resources provides has several benefits. First, it can help to 
reinforce accountability and obliges donors to strategically prioritize resources. Second, it provides a 
forum for vital exchange on donor expectations as well as crucial dialogue with stakeholders. And last, it 
enables governing bodies to better plan their financial commitments to recipients.   
 
20. One of the key outcomes of a successful funding mechanism is a multi-year programming 
„envelope‟ (the financing needs of a fund) backed by a realistic, and transparent resource envelope (the 
financial contributions from donors). Other outcomes, no less important, are agreement on goals and 
expected achievements for the funding period and a common set of financial arrangements, such as 
coordinated donor payment schedules and the use of promissory notes or letters of credit
2
. Using these 
financial instruments allows a fund to make commitments to recipients upfront and in advance of cash 
receipt from donors. Further, these instruments have the added benefit of easing the pressure on donors‟ 
annual cash outlays because cash payment is requested from the donor only as needed to cover medium-
term disbursement needs.
3
   
   
VI. CGIAR Fund—Moving to an Established Resource Mobilization Mechanism 
 
21. Moving to a formal and transparent resource mobilization mechanism is the natural next step in 
the reform process of the CGIAR system. Taking advantage of lessons learned from other global funds, 
the Fund Council could consider developing and implementing a process inspired by the approaches and 
benefits as outlined in Sections IV and V.   
 
22. The „best fit‟ mechanism for any fund is one that takes into account its unique characteristics. For 
the CGIAR Fund, this would mean a funding mechanism that is flexible and adaptable. These two traits 
are very important to the CGIAR Fund. It has growing demands, and it has a diverse set of donors with 
distinct budgetary cycles and processes. This translates into a requirement for an appropriate 
mechanism—one that enables donor contributions to be received outside of a formal contribution 
announcement session. 
                                                          
2 The use of promissory notes and letters of credit, with corresponding multi-year encashment schedules, are typically used by funds which 
finance programs and projects that disburse over a multi-year period. 
 
3 In the beginning of the GEF, donors agreed to accelerate their cash payments well in advance of expected disbursement needs of the recipients. 
This approach created a liquidity reserve that helped to remove the doubt, in those early days, of whether funds would be available to disburse 
when needed.  This in turn helped to ensure an uninterrupted, but growing, work program. 
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23. It was agreed at the July 2011 Fund Council meeting that the CGIAR Fund needed to establish a 
predictable long-term funding mechanism that included multi-year commitments from donors. This 
mechanism would need to be approved by the Fund Council. It was further suggested that the CGIAR 
Fund should aim to convene a high-level ministerial meeting at the end of 2012 as a first-ever 
contribution meeting to the CGIAR Fund.  
   
24. To reach these goals, this paper suggests the Fund Council consider and agree to the following 
actions:    
 
 Prepare a draft resource mobilization mechanism „roadmap‟, based on the November 
2011 discussion of this paper in Rome, Italy. The roadmap would take into account 
follow-up consultations with stakeholders. It would include proposals for (i) a schedule 
of meetings and topics for donor consideration and agreement; and (ii) rules of 
participation for any subsequent donor meeting (i.e., observer participation and minimum 
contributions). The Fund Office shall draft this roadmap.  
 
 Convene a donor meeting in Seattle, Washington, in advance of the March 2012 Fund 
Council meeting. All current and potential donors to the CGIAR Fund would be invited. 
At the close of this meeting, participants would endorse a „roadmap‟ that sets out a plan 
to (i) establish a [resource mobilization mechanism appropriate to the CGIAR Fund; and 
(ii) convene a high-level ministerial contribution session.  The Fund Office will convene 
and support this donor meeting. 
 
 Form a Donor Contribution Working Group to draft decision documents covering topics 
such as the number of years in the commitment funding cycle, off-cycle contributions, 
and donor financial arrangements. The final output of this Committee is a „contribution 
declaration‟ that sets out the proposed resource mobilization mechanism.  This Working 
Group would be supported by the Fund Office.  
 
 Convene a high-level ministerial meeting at the end of 2012. Donors would be expected 
at this meeting to endorse the „contribution declaration‟ followed by contributions to the 
CGIAR Fund covering the agreed funding cycle. This meeting will then be repeated per 
the cycle agreed by the donors. 
 
VII.   Conclusion 
 
25. An agreed resource mobilization mechanism will provide several benefits. First, it helps to 
reinforce collective donor accountability and facilitates donors‟ strategic prioritization of resources. 
Second, it provides a forum for crucial dialogue for stakeholders. Lastly, it facilitates better planning of 
work programs and resultant financial commitments to recipients. A predictable flow of aid is particularly 
important to the CGIAR Fund at a time when it is trying to scale up investment in scientific research that 
is characterized by large, annual fixed costs, such as hiring researchers and technical staff.  Scientific 
research is not easy to switch on and off and doing so results in huge inefficiencies of resource use 
 
26. With a formal resource mobilization mechanism, estimates of financial inflows for the CGIAR 
Fund would be more predictable.
4 
This improvement over the current annual process would enable the 
Fund Council and the Consortium to optimize financial planning and help ensure matching of the planned 
                                                          
4 Currently, projections of inflows from CGIAR Fund donors are based on information passed through unofficial statements made by Fund 
Donors to the Fund Office making it difficult to develop reliable projections.  
 
 
7 
 
inflows (projected resource envelope) with the planned outflows (projected programming envelope). This 
in turn would create more confidence in the CGIAR reform and strengthen the buy-in from stakeholders, 
as well as support the long-term planning of CRPs and System Costs.  
 
27. However, it is important to point out that even with a formalized mechanism for resource 
mobilization, uncertainties in predicting donor financing will continue—on some level. Contributions 
across multiple years may not be paid in the year for which they were scheduled due to political or 
budgetary complications. Hence, an adequate rolling level of CGIAR Fund liquidity must be maintained 
to avoid disruption of research programs. 
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Annex 
Resource Mobilization Mechanisms of Several Multilateral Funds 
 In which CGIAR Donors Participate 
 
Fund Name Programming 
Approach 
Donor Financing Mechanisms Participating CGIAR Fund  and 
MDTF Donors 
Climate 
Investment 
Funds 
(established in 
2008) 
Investment 
Plans and 
pipeline 
management are 
based on the 
total pledged 
amount 
 No formal resource mobilization 
mechanism 
 Initial pledging meeting attended by 
high level ministerial representatives  
 Subsequent pledges are announced by 
donors at CIF Committee meetings 
 Contributions accepted at any time 
 Donors make multi-year commitments 
 Voluntary approach 
 Contribution payment schedules are 
based on donor preferences 
 Promissory notes and letters of credit are 
acceptable forms of payment 
Australia 
Canada 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Japan  
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
GAFSP 
(established in 
2010) 
Agricultural 
Food Security 
Plans and calls 
for proposals 
are based on the 
total pledged 
amount 
 No formal resource mobilization 
mechanism 
 No formal pledging meeting was 
convened  
 Initial and subsequent pledges 
announced by donors at GAFSP 
Committee meetings 
 Contributions accepted at any time 
 Donors make multi-year commitments 
 Voluntary approach 
 Contribution payment schedules are 
based on donor preferences 
 Promissory notes and letters of credit are 
acceptable forms of payment 
Australia 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
Canada 
Ireland 
Spain 
United States 
GEF 
(established in 
1991) 
Four-year 
programming 
envelope/target 
based on 
replenishment 
resolutions 
 Formal resource mobilization 
mechanism based on a four-year 
replenishment cycle 
 Pledges announced at a final pledging 
session at close of each replenishment 
meeting 
 Contributions accepted outside of the 
replenishment „cycle‟ 
 Donors make multi-year commitments 
 Burden-sharing framework.  
 Contributions payment schedules are 
coordinated.  
 Promissory notes and letters of credit are 
acceptable forms of payment 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
China 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Portugal 
Russian Federation 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
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Fund Name Programming 
Approach 
Donor Financing Mechanisms Participating CGIAR Fund  and 
MDTF Donors 
Global Fund for 
AIDS, 
Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
(established in 
2002 
Multi-year 
programming 
planning, with 
periodic review 
of funding 
availability  
 Formal resource mobilization 
mechanism covering 3-year cycle 
 Pledges announced at final pledging 
session 
 Contributions accepted at any time 
outside of the replenishment cycle 
 Donors may make multi-year 
commitments 
 Voluntary approach 
 Contribution payment schedules are 
based on donor preferences 
 Promissory notes and letters of credit are 
acceptable forms of payment 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bill and 
Melinda Gates 
Foundation 
Canada 
China 
Denmark 
European 
Commission 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Portugal 
Russian Federation 
South Africa 
Spain  
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
United Kingdom 
United States 
LDCF/SCCF 
(established in 
2002 and 2004  
respectively) 
Annual  
Programming 
 No formal resource mobilization 
mechanism  
 Pledges announced at pledging sessions 
held during GEF Council meetings 
 Contributions accepted at any time  
 Some donors make multi-year 
commitments 
 Voluntary approach 
 Contribution payment schedules are 
based on donor preferences 
 Promissory notes and letters of credit are 
acceptable forms of payment 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain  
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
 
